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STATE OF THE ART IN AIR SAFETY
By C. 0. MILLERt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HERE HAS BEEN unprecedented attention focused on air safety in
recent years. Of that, there can be no doubt. Perhaps this attention has
been the result of socio-technological evolution-a concern for fellowman's
physical well-being amid astounding mechanical marvels which often seem
incomprehensible to the point of being frightening. Perhaps it has simply
resulted from communications media being more effective in bringing trag-
edy closer to the not-so-directly-involved personnel. Witness the reaction
to the Apollo 204 accident. The philosophical reasons for the why of a
change notwithstanding, it behooves society in general, and professionals in
particular, to periodically pause, and ask, "Just where have we been; where
are we; and what must we appreciate about the future?" This paper at-
tempts to do just that for today's air safety art. Or call it air safety dis-
cipline if you will, depending on your standards of accreditation for a new
field.
As part of the Symposium on Air Safety conducted by the School of
Law at Southern Methodist University, this discussion extends somewhat
beyond air safety per se. The purposes and practices of law and the pur-
poses and practices of safety are not unrelated. Based on prior investigations
by this author among others and a previous law-safety symposium, one
might conclude that aviation law and safety are entwined much like sep-
arate vines in a dense forest, each striving for sunlight, but crawling all
over each other enroute. When each truly recognizes the objectives of the
other, and bends a bit to give a little more room, both prosper.'
Thus air safety will be discussed in terms of its state of development. But
emphasis will also be placed on misunderstandings or unresolved problems
in accident prevention that bear upon the law-safety interface.
II. EVOLUTION OF SAFETY
Within the span of two generations at best, aviation has transitioned
from a "white scarf" barnstorming image to a rather integral part of our
everyday life. Within this era, formalized safety efforts have evolved sig-
nificantly, beginning with the licensing and regulatory procedures of the
tB.S., M.I.T.; M.S., U.S.C.; Former test pilot, Chance Vought Corp., Consultant in Aerospace
Safety & Direc. of Research, Institute of Aerospace Safety & Management, U.S.C.
'Miller, Legal Ramifications of Aircraft Accident/Malfunction Data, I PROCEEDINGS OF THE
IAS NATIONAL AEROSPACE SYSTEMS RELIABILITY SYMPOSIUM (New York: AIAA 1962); Miller,
The Safety Information Challenge, ASSE JOURNAL, Sept. 1968 (Originally presented at the Flight
Safety Foundation Seminar, New York, 15 Oct. 1964); Miller, Aviation Law-Air Safety (A Sym-
posium Report), ALUMNI REVIEW (Aerospace Safety Division, Univ. of S. Cal.) Fall, 1964; Miller,
The Influence of Systems Engineering and Management on Aviation Products Liability, AsTRo-
NAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS, Sept. 1966 at 62; C. Miller, The Engineer, Lawyer, and Flight
Safety, Presented at the SAE-ASNE National Aero-Nautical Meeting, Washington, D. C., 9 April
1963 (Flight Safety Foundation, New York, New York).
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Bureau of Air Commerce in the late 1920's. A decade later the next major
milestone in air safety evolved. Modern day accident investigation proce-
dures are traceable to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 with the first
major investigation involving, as aviation buffs might suspect, a DC-3!'
As World War II approached and was underway, however, safety was
still something that impugned the ego of any red-blooded pilot. Persons
suggesting that accidents were anything more than unfortuitous events
were considered sissified. Certainly at that time, the moral motivation for
protection of life in aviation was apparent; but luck was the name of the
game. Only the most farsighted individuals viewed accident prevention as
a specific technique that could be applied in a rational sense. With few ex-
ceptions, such as Jerome Lederer,' the names of these men have been lost
in technology's cemetery of forgotten reports.
World War II had its effect on safety technology as it did in many fields.
The accident scorekeepers were hard at work, and a few safety education
posters were utilized for good measure. When the bent aircraft and broken
people were tallied, however, far more losses were found due to accidents
than to combat.4 The fatality and destroyed aircraft rates as a function of
flying hours were not bad when comparing stateside and overseas losses;
but combat potential in terms of men and machines had been seriously
compromised through sheer numbers of catastrophic accidents. As a result,
a cry for professional flight safety work was noted early in 1946. There
was concurrent activity pertaining to civil aviation, as evidenced by the
start of the Flight Safety Foundation near the close of the war.! Then a
landmark paper by Steiglitz in 1948 clearly delineated the concept of a
specialized approach to flight safety engineering.7
Thus, a major change in safety philosophy was born if a comparison be
made of air safety with traditional modes of safety, e.g., industrial or traf-
fic. Air safety was cited as a means of enhancing mission accomplishment,
whether that "mission" was delivering bombs or making a corporate profit
while providing safe and sane air transportation. A suggested methodology
breakthrough involved safety specialists plus an inherent duty of accident
prevention resting on each man in every organization.
The 1950's saw at least two more fundamental developments. The
first was the formation of the military safety centers at Norton Air Force
Base, California, Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia, and the United
States Army's Ft. Rucker. Concurrent with these actions was the assign-
ment of safety officers at all levels of command through all military services,
i.e., the implementation of safety specialists in the operational world. The
'CAB, Report of the Investigation of the Accident Involving Aircraft of U.S. Registry NC
21789 Which Occurred Near Lovettsvlle, Virginia on August 31, 1940 (Washington, D.C. 1940).
' Former Chief of the CAB Bureau of Safety; Former Director of the Flight Safety Foundation;
Presently Director of Manned Space Flight Safety, NASA.
4 Address by Brig. Gen. C. B. Stewart before the graduating class, Aerospace Safety Division,
U. So. Cal., Los Angeles, Cal., 17 Dec. 1965.
a A. Wood, The Organization and Utilization of an Aircraft Manufacturer's Air Safety Pro-
gram, Unpublished Paper Presented to the IAS Meeting, New York, N.Y., Jan. 1946.
' Flight Safety Foundation, Inc., Certificate of Incorporation, Filed with the State of New
York, 12 April 1945.
'Stieglitz, Engin¢¢rin5 for Safety, AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING REVIEW, Feb. 1948.
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University of Southern California's safety education programs have pro-
vided over 5,000 graduates of 10 to 12 week intensive study programs
aimed at these positions since 1953. Attendees have also included repre-
sentatives of 50 foreign nations, and occasionally, civilian personnel. In re-
cent years, airlines, business aviation, and other groups (including lawyers)
have been provided similar education programs but on a reduced time
scale. The evolutionary trend was one of changing the emphasis from acci-
dent investigation to accident prevention.
The second major impact of the 1950's was the realization of the eco-
nomic motive for safety. Single seated aircraft were being delivered at more
than $1 million a copy; others came much higher. The military realized
that although lives remained important and that although mission ac-
complishment was its fundamental goal, economy was perhaps the greatest
real world motivator for improved accident prevention. This trend has
continued today when one realizes the annual "book" dollar loss of air
vehicle accidents by the United States military services approximates $750
million!
Safety specialist-oriented personnel were to be found in some airlines
during the 1950's. Perhaps Carl Christenson of United Airlines was the
most prominent. For the most part, however, the increasing complexity of
the machines and the "system" had not fully arrived or had not been
adequately recognized by the airline community. There are many who feel
the early losses of the first (and second) generation jets by airlines fall
basically into this area of explanation.
The influence of the missile and space age added still more dimensions to
the safety art discipline. Not only did a new set of hazards arise (propel-
lants, space navigation, and the like), but the flight crew was finally rec-
ognized for the tremendous contribution to safety that it really was. It
was painfully recognized that without pilots aboard, air vehicles such as
missiles had to be made right the first time; the term "system safety" had
come into being.
Actually, there had been hints of the system safety concept in Stieglitz's
1948 paper and in early papers by this author in 1954" and 1957.10 Also,
an evolution in military weapon system procurement transpired in the late
195O's and early 1960's that further contributed to a definition of the sys-
tem safety concept. But all in all, system safety truly differs from previous
accident prevention efforts in only three ways, albeit these ways are highly
significant improvements. These differences are:
(1) The "System" could encompass much more than just the air-
craft. It could include support equipment, facilities, the people in-
volved, and training programs. Or, it could be applied to any identi-
fiable segment of the whole.
"A given accident's "book" dollar loss entails essentially the cost price of the air vehicle as
represented by the total procurement contract divided by the number of air vehicles purchased.
Values of human lives and indirect costs are rarely ever discussed.
C. Miller, Applying Lessons Learned from Accident Investigations Through a Systems Safety
Concept, Presented at the first IAS Naval Aviation Meeting, San Diego, Cal., Aug. 1957.
10 Id.
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(2) The accident prevention scope involves planning and control
on an entire life cycle basis, from conception of a system through its
operational phase.
(3) There are specific safety tasks contracted in the engineering
phases to supplement those conceptually similar efforts going on dur-
ing operations.
By the mid-1960's, the system safety concept was observable in the Su-
personic Transport program (by direction of the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration). Within the past six months to a year, it has been applied by at
least one major transport aircraft manufacturer of his own volition. Inter-
est by the airlines in application of this concept has been minimal although
it was suggested to them specifically in 1966.1 The evolution of air safety
can thus be summarized as follows:
(1) The safety specialist has appeared at both the operational and
engineering end of the system spectrum.
(2) Economic and mission factors have joined moral justification
as basic reasons for improved accident prevention."2
(3) The approach to safety today is prevention, not just after-the-
fact accident investigation.
(4) The system safety concept involving complex engineering,
management, and operational relationships has become a part of
aerospace life.
Although not germane to the air safety state of the art per se, it should
be recognized that a major revolution is going on in relating various forms
of safety activity to one another. Heretofore, industrial safety, traffic safe-
ty, missile safety, and nuclear safety have tended to pursue separate paths
of technological development. As exemplified by major organizational
changes in the military and industry, most of these areas are learning that
accident prevention as a discipline can best be achieved by a major amalga-
mation of these splinter areas. The system safety approach may well be the
methodology that brings these various groups closer together since it has ap-
plication in all fields.
Il1. TODAY'S PRECEPTS CONCERNING ACCIDENT PREVENTION
Traditionally, one can identify principal approaches to safety as prac-
ticed by particular organizations or groups of people. They are the identi-
fiable philosophies and modi operandi, albeit not necessarily the only ones
to be found in the total group. They are interrelated. They are changing,
since nothing about safety is static. Listed in Table 1 are these principal
safety images in the minds of the groups shown-images that one will en-
counter. They go well beyond aviation safety, just as law goes well beyond
" C. Miller, The Application of System Safety and Management to the Civil Air Carrier Sys-
tem, Presented and Published in the Proceedings of the ALPA Air Safety Forum, U. So. Cal., Los
Angeles, Cal., Oct. 1966.
" A rather strong case can also be presented for the prestige factor as exemplified by the
Apollo 204 loss. Cost, mission, or people are not considered to be the principal reasons why NASA
has done so much towards modifying its safety programs in the past year. A similar situation arose
recently following the USAF B-52 accident near Thule Air Force Base in Greenland. Cessation of
airborne alerts was influenced by world opinion (prestige) as much as anything else.
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aviation law. They are shown in no particular order except that Public is
first. The Public has had its thoughts shaped by a few million years of
trying to avoid danger. It deserves to be first!
TABLE 1
1. The Public (P): Safety is restrictive: don't do this, don't do that. It is
protection of person, not property. It is produced by a strange lucky com-
bination of conscious and subconscious acts either by the individual or
for him. (Ignorance is bliss!)
2. National Safety Council (NSC): Copious statistics must be kept so that
everybody can be told how bad things are. Education is the main tool of
prevention. People are the only answer; they are the last ones on the re-
sponsibility chain. (They are the easiest to blame!)
3. Department of Defense (DOD): Safety is a necessary part of mission
effectiveness that involves both men and equipment. Put a number on it
so that one may "scientifically" equate safety with other variables that
affect decisions towards cost effectiveness. (When we try to find out what
went wrong, the man who did the evaluations and made the decision has
been transferred to a world bank, or somewhere!)
4. United States Air Force (USAF): Regulations must be issued to cover
all eventualities. Then there must be detailed inspections and reports to
assure that people follow the orders. (By the numbers . . . 1, 2, 3, 4!)
5. United States Navy (USN): Accountability is the middle name of the
captain of the ship. He is the Chief Safety Officer-and chief everything
else. Accident prevention is his responsibility. Anyone else working therein
is just a crutch for a less than 100% commander. (Hallowed are the
banks of the Severn!)
6. United States Army (USA): There is a group at the arsenal who have
been building these things safe for a long time. Do the best with what
is available. (Ya gotta expect losses!)
7. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA): Prior to Apollo
204: Make it reliable, and it shall be safe. Instill constant awareness in
highly selected and trained individuals, and the good guys will prevail.
After Apollo 204: All the above plus special attention to system safety
engineering and management. (Just how much does Congress expect?)
8. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): Standards have been issued in
accordance with authorities granted in the FAA Act of 1958. It is the
FAA's duty to enforce those standards. All FAA work pertains to safety.
(P.S. . . . Those are minimum standards.)
9. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB): Senator Magnuson called
NTSB the "Supreme Court of Transportation Safety." An overview safetyjob is needed for all tranportation modes. This includes what formerly
were investigation functions of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Safety. Objectives, prevention-oriented studies are also to be accomplishea.
(But how can this be done with only 184 people? There were 125 for
aviation alone when under the CAB.)
10. Public Health Service (PHS): Accidental death is a leading cause of loss
of life and ergo, a health problem. It is epidemic and therefore is subject
to the epidemiological approach. (First, however, someone will have to
research all aspects of the situation!)
11. National Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB): Until recently, accident pre-
vention was a matter of "write an ordinance and enforce the law." (At
least it produced revenue.) Today's program aims at the machine and
environment as well as at the man, both before and after the impact.
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(Thanks to Ralph Nader!)
12. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC): It is obvious that there must not
be any accidents. Accordingly, there can be no question that AEC regu-
lations must be followed to the letter. (Besides, who knows enough about
this business to ask-or answer-questions?)
13. Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA): Pilot's opinion must be followed
because, after all, they are up there, too. They are also a rather professional
group. (Look at their salaries.) Given better training and better facili-
ties, they can "hack" anything. (If some of them don't trip on their
white scarfs!)
14. General Aviation (GA): "Flying safety is when an airplane operates ac-
cording to the pilot's will, totally," from "Quest for the Great God
Safety," Flying, June 1965. ("To be, or not to be . . . in the same sky as
the airliners," from Shakespeare, 1603, and Miller, 1968.)
15. Flight Safety Foundation (FSF): Everybody needs a conscience. Some-
body needs to be a catalyst. (But when it comes to soliciting member-
ships, the question arises, "Why did you have to rock our boat?")
16. Institute of Aerospace Safety and Management (USC): The name of the
game is total system accident prevention through the interdisciplinary
approach. Higher education plays a major role therein. (But how do you
get a safety program through the curriculum committee without a hun-
dred years of PhD. candidates?)
17. Aerospace Industry (Al): Tell us what you want in accident prevention,
and you will get it. (For a price!)
18. American Bar Association (ABA): Punishment or threats thereof repre-
sent deterrents to accidents. Within a main objective of social justice our
ethical practices produce the greatest good for the greatest number of
people. (Assuming the attorneys are equal in capability and there are capa-
ble judges and juries!)
Despite these oversimplifications for the sake of emphasis (and the par-
enthetical observations that just could not be resisted), the fact remains
that P + NSC + DOD + USAF + USN + USA +NASA + FAA
+ NTSB + PHS + NHSB + AEC + ALPA + GA + FSF + USC
+ AI + ABA + many others equals one tremendous amount of accident
prevention motivation, dedication, and action, without which many of us
would be lucky to be alive. The differences in approach, apparent in Table
1 (and the shortcomings implied), simply reflect the different origin, evo-
lution, and environment applicable to a given segment of the accident
prevention world. To suggest that any one approach is significantly su-
perior to another, or that either can do the total job alone, would be quite
foolhardy.
The previous discussion notwithstanding, there are certain accident pre-
vention precepts that appear to enjoy near unanimous endorsement by
safety personnel today. These endorsements include:
(1) Accident causation is a sequence of events describable in man,
machine, media (environment), management, and other variables, de-
pending upon the depth to which one wishes to take the analytical
model. For optimum prevention activity, these variables are not
describable by a single cause.
(2) Accident causal factors are seen repeated over and over again.
Indeed, with the possible exception of rare hazards brought about by
[Vol. 34
AIR SAFETY SYMPOSIUM
highly advanced technology, one hardly ever sees a truly new safety
problem.
(3) Although accident prevention is far from being an exact
science, its analysis methodology has made remarkable strides in re-
cent years that entail highly advanced technical approaches."5
(4) Management responsibility cannot and should not be denied
relative to accident prevention. Man is ultimately responsible for his
own survival. But when groups are formed to better effect given
missions, safety becomes more than protection effected through the
individual; group leaders must assume responsibility for safety of
and created by the whole.
(5) At some level of task complexity and size of the organization,
specialized approaches to accident prevention in addition to safety
being everybody's job produces more accident prevention per unit of
resource expenditure than safety simply being everybody's job. This
entails additional obligation/accountability through the specialist, not
merely his substitution for others.
Within this basic framework there have been efforts to clearly define
the professional safety task. Table 2 reveals a generalized view as developed
by the American Society of Safety Engineers.
" C. Miller, Hazard Analysis and Identification in System Safety Engineering, Presented to the





















On previous occasions, the a-Athor cited tasks in more detail as speci-
fically applied in the aerospace field. These are shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
SYSTEM SAFETY TASKS
1. Develop and coordinate implementation of safety plans including program
accident prevention, system safety engineering, accident/incident investi-
gation and disaster control plans.
2. Assist in establishment of specific accident prevention requirements.
3. Conduct or participate in hazard analyses, including the control process
related thereto.
4. Determine and/or review emergency procedures.
5. Participate in design reviews and similar milestone events during product
development and use.
6. Maintain an accident/safety information data center.
7. Effect liaison with other safety organizations.
8. Provide recommendations for and/or conduct safety research, study, and
testing.
9. Implement safety education, training, indoctrination, and motivation pro-
grams.
10. Participate in group safety efforts such as councils, standardization boards,
and surveys.
11. Direct or otherwise participate in accident/incident investigations.
12. Follow-up all action resulting from accident/incident investigations.
13. Provide objective response to safety inquiry as a staff advisor, in the con-
fidential sense when appropriate.
These tasks have been exposed in their original form for over three years
to numerous critical groups (including almost 200 Advanced Safety Pro-
gram Management students). Modern aviation safety effort can be de-
scribed by one or more of these functions. Competent management,
through the division of work principle, will assign such tasks to their per-
sonnel, safety specialists or otherwise.
IV. UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS
There remain several major challenges or unresolved problems that face
the safety fraternity. While keeping the discussion rather broad, and with-
out any suggestion or priorities, these include:
(1) Lack of total understanding and/or acceptance by the layman
of safety as an integral part of mission and cost effectiveness, and in-
volving more than merely personal survival.
(2) Determination of the optimum level of system complexity or
the nature of a given organization that merits a specialized approach
to safety, e.g., an identifiable system safety organization containing
specially qualified personnel.
(3) An almost total lack of hard data bearing on the economics of
safety. What really constitutes investments, losses, and returns associ-
ated with safety? Such information is needed by management to be-
come more efficient in expenditure of funds towards accident pre-
vention.
1968]
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(4) Limited ability to assess the reason for "action failure," i.e.,
the places between accident occurrence and similar accident recur-
rence where much of today's well meaning work falls down the pro-
verbial crack.
(5) The pitiful state of safety information storage and retrieval.
There have been countless safety lessons learned but their identifica-
tion and use within time constraints present on new programs is ser-
iously compromised by inadequate storage and retrieval systems in
existence today.
(6) The need to provide a broad base safety education program to
include professional development through the PhD. level.
(7) Determination of a method of investigating accidents from the
human factors viewpoint-psychological as well as physiological.
(8) Better integration of the safety engineering and operational
safety efforts, especially to ensure better test and indoctrination pro-
grams that minimize accidents during early parts of the learning
curve on new vehicles.
(9) Expansion of the systems concept into non-aerospace endea-
vors (with appropriate modifications), as a process that can more
readily handle the multi-factor basic nature of an accident than do
current concepts.
(10) Conflict between legal requirements to establish fault during
investigations and the need for delineation of all causal factors in the
interest of more fundamental approaches to accident prevention ra-
ther than just enforcement.
Item (10) cannot be emphasized too strongly as being the basic fac-
tor underlying misunderstandings between the legal profession and safety
specialists. The lawyer, in seeking social justice through tort litigation, for
example, must establish a proximate cause as a fundamental part of his
case. In most situations, proximate cause becomes a single factor, or at
least is identified in the minds of the layman as a single factor. The re-
quired proof of standard of care (duty) and failure to meet that standard
of care (breach of the duty) entail a concept of negligence that carries
with it a "fault" label. This in turn, is interpreted by the layman as "who
are they going to hang?" Suddenly the layman just does not want to be-
come involved.
In accident investigation as a prevention task on the other hand, the
purpose is not social justice, but rather it is protection of life, mission ac-
complishment or conservation of resources in general. It is a matter of try-
ing to establish all factors as objectively as humanly possible. It is a matter
of making recommendations and ultimately taking action on any factor
that is determined to be potentially accident preventive in nature, con-
sistent with resources and time available to take such action. There is no
person or organization that is a target or a bastion to be defended. Any
resemblance of these causal factors to the proximate cause as defined by
law or determined by a judge or jury could be quite coincidental.
It is fully recognized that the accident investigator must go through
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the "cause" phase in his thinking, or more precisely, his cognitive process.
There is even experimental evidence to this effect. 4 However, if profes-
sionally trained and motivated, he will not be satisfied to choose the cause
and build his report or recommendations only around that finding. Un-
fortunately, the charter provided the NTSB Bureau of Aviation Safety as
carried over from the FAA Act of 19 5 8 demands establishment of the most
probable cause, as most military directives insist on establishing the pri-
mary cause in their accidents. These become accident board functions as
compared to the functions of an investigator in his fact-finding capacity.
Hence, the conclusion is reached that most accident boards have been di-
rected to be quasi-legal bodies regardless of their purported motives.
Despite the desire to think otherwise, this author believes that any acci-
dent deliberative body that is directed to find the most probable cause,
the primary cause, or any similarly single factor oriented conclusion is not
working optimally in the accident prevention field. If fault or proximate
cause is required, let that be the function of a court of law or a military
collateral investigation. If primary or probable causes are required for data
classification purposes, let their determination be the prerogative of the
data processing group. If primary causes are required for management
data chart presentation to show priorities in required safety areas, let the
chart preparers make the classification selection (they will probably dis-
tort them in any case to prove whatever they are selling!).
If accident prevention boards cannot be established with capability for
attaining off-the-record evidence and developing preventive recommenda-
tions without having to decide on the cause, they had best be forgotten.
Save the administrative expense of two types of hearings; go to the com-
plete adversary system; and be satisfied with restricted data flow into and
out of accident investigations. Be satisfied with deterrence being the prin-
cipal mode of accident prevention. Of course, such action would come as
a considerable shock to safety specialists who believe they have come quite
a way from the red flag, hard hat and perform-safely-or-punish con-
cepts.
V. THE AVIATION SAFETY RECORD
The question cannot be overlooked as to just why aviation accident pre-
vention practices should be improved, if indeed they need to be improved.
One argument states we are well within risks of normal living (whatever
that is!). The other argument states we should be continuing to do what
we can where we can to conserve our personal and material resources con-
sistent with a progressive society (whatever that is!). Implicit in such dis-
cussions is a look at the past record and an attempt to project it into the
future. Unfortunately, there is no measure that adequately provides a
good index of accident prevention potential or even achievement on a
short term basis. Accident rates as a function of flight hours may be the
least of many evils in after-the-fact assessment. But everyone close to the
"4 Braunstein & Coleman, An Information-Processing Model of the Aircraft Accident Investi-
gator, HUMAN FACTORS, Feb. 1967.
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accident statistics field quickly recognizes that the power of the definition
pen far outweighs the power of the plotted data.
Nevertheless, an undeniable improvement has occurred in aviation safe-
ty in the last twenty to thirty years, which is really the limit time span in
which meaningful records have been kept. However, in our more or less
immediate past that includes the jet transport era, the statistical rarity of
airline accidents precludes any assessment of trends based on accident rates.
General aviation on the other hand has been kind enough to try harder.
They are having sufficient accidents that a trend does seem to be detectable,
and it represents an improvement in the last three to five years compared
to a plateau that existed in the previous decade. There has been a rather
strong hint from the military accident records that the specialist approach
to operational safety has paid good dividends in accident prevention be-
tween the early 1950's and early 1960's. It has also been suggested that
this improvement has leveled off, much as a learning curve tends to level
off." This means that some major breakthrough will be needed to induce
additional significant improvement. The system safety concept represents
a possibility in this direction.
Obviously, rates do not tell the story. They tell little about exposure;
they tell little about where the rates are going when the curves are rela-
tively flat; they tell little about the impact of one or more particular kinds
of accidents on the public. They tell nothing about the accident the ob-
server may be worried about-the one he may be in.
The required perspective for state of the art in safety, however, is avia-
tion in total. The total fatalities in aviation accidents these days (military
and civil systems combined) are on the order of 2,100 people annually.
This represents less than 2 percent of the total accidental deaths expe-
rienced in the United States each year and less than 4 percent of motor
vehicle fatalities alone.
The total dollar loss in aircraft accidents has never been seriously tabu-
lated to the author's knowledge. Using what data is available, however,
this number is believed to be in the region of the $1.5 to $2 billion an-
nually. This assumes certain book values for the machines and an estimate
of some of the other definable costs. It does not include indirect costs which
in the industrial safety field can run 3 to 5 times the direct costs of acci-
dents.
To continue the comparison with the automobile safety field, the avia-
tion accident economic loss is about 15 percent to 20 percent as large.
Hence, it can be argued that in today's market, the cost proportion is signi-
ficantly larger than that represented by fatalities, which only proves once
again that statistics is the art of drawing a straight line between unwar-
ranted assumptions and a prejudiced conclusion.
Actually, aviation's concern for safety is not merely based on the past
but is far more concerned with the future. This concern could be ex-
pressed simply as the threatened single loss of 300 persons and $55 million
" C. Miller, The Role of System Safety in Aerospace Management, Jan. 1967 (unpublished
thesis, U. So. Cal.).
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in an "airbus." It could be the one-a-day brand major catastrophe of a
civil airliner forecast by Lundberg for the 1990 period, assuming no major
decrease in accident rate combined with increased operations by then."5
Philosophically, it is argued that we cannot morally stand by and per-
mit the number of air fatalities to grow in the manner automobile fatali-
ties have mushroomed. After all, now we have technology to apply toward
further aircraft accident prevention-technology that was not even dreamt
of at a comparable period of development of surface transportation.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The motivation for the past development of improved aircraft accident
prevention methodology has not been personal protection alone. It has
resulted from attempts to provide better air transportation or other forms
of mission accomplishment at minimal cost in either lives or material re-
sources. As society becomes increasingly complex in general, identification
and solution of problems related thereto become similarly more complex.
An evolutionary result which is by no means unique to the safety field, is
specialization in tasks, specialization in personnel.
Interestingly enough for safety, however, this produces a paradox in
view of the broad, interdisciplinary nature of accident prevention. Is the
safety professional really a specialist, or is he a generalist? Actually, the
safety professional is both. He is a specialist in attitude (accident preven-
tion) and a generalist in knowledge and skills. This in turn produces an
interesting comparison with members of the legal profession; a lawyer
might be described as a specialist in attitude (social justice) and a general-
ist in knowledge and skills.
Hence, it is not surprising that the same set of facts as exhibited in an
accident investigation are interpreted from two different viewpoints, each
based on its own contribution to be made to society. Of course, the pro-
fession of law has been around for quite some time. The profession of acci-
dent prevention has just begun. This paper has hopefully provided the le-
gal profession, as well as others, a better understanding of the new arrival.
'8 Lundberg, Aviation Safety and the SST, ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS 29, Jan. 1965.
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